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Fragrant or Foul? Regulation of the
Global Perfume Industry and the
Implications for American Sovereignty
By CAROLINE M. REEBS*
[H]owever paradoxical it sounds, the measurement of a state's
capacity to act as an independent unit within the international
system - the condition that sovereignty purports both to grant and
describe - depends on the breadth and depth of its links to other
states.'
I. Introduction
There is a battle being fought in local courtrooms between
employees and employers,2 lamented abroad by venerable European
business leaders,' and analyzed extensively by public health interest
groups.' The effect of fragranced personal care products, "the new
* Caroline M. Reebs is a third-year student at the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. She received her B.A. in 2007 from the University of
Toronto. The author would like to thank Georges Nabaa for his encouragement and
Patricia Hassard for her invaluable editing assistance.
1. Anne Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,
40 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 283, 286 (2004), cited in Sophie Clavier, Contrasting Franco-
American Perspectives on Sovereignty, 14 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 17 (2008).
2. See, e.g., McDonald v. Potter, No. 1:06-CV-1, 2007 WL 2300332, (E.D.Tenn.
Aug. 7, 2007); Montenez-Denman v. Slater, No. 98-4426, 2000 WL 263279, (C.A.6
Mar. 1, 2000). See also Hunt v. St. Peter School, 963 F.Supp. 843 (W.D.Mo., 1997) (a
similar case in a school environment).
3. Nicole Vulser, Les Crdateurs de Parfums Ont la Commission Europdenne
Dans le Nez, LE MONDE, Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://www.
lemonde.fr/economie/article/2010/01/12/les-createurs-de-parfums-ont-la-commission-
europeenne-dans-le-nez_1290614_3234.html (Explanation by a public relations
manager for a large European perfume company, noting "Our palette is diminishing.
This is comparable to telling a painter he's not allowed to use red, then blue or
yellow.").
4. Christy L. De Vader & Paxson Barker, Fragrance in the Workplace is the New
Second-Hand Smoke, 16 AM. Soc. Bus. & BEHAv. SCI. PROCEEDINGS (2009),
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second-hand smoke,"' is raising a global stink. Companies are going
"scentless,"' perfume manufacturers are decrying their shrinking
arsenal,' and consumers are protesting the lack of federal oversight.'
While the issues surrounding fragranced personal care products are
surfacing worldwide, they are increasingly problematic in the United
States.' This paper examines the comparatively weak American
fragranced-cosmetic regulatory regime and looks at some potential
remedies. The implications of the present legal framework, both for
consumer health and for industry competitiveness are highlighted.
Section I of this note provides a legal context, beginning with a
discussion of the current U.S. regime governing fragranced personal
care products."o To identify the scope and nature of the regulatory
issues in need of consideration, the U.S. legal framework is compared
to the E.U. system of cosmetic regulation. Part I concludes with an
examination of the growing role of international organizations in
filling the regulatory gaps left by both the U.S. and E.U. national
governments. Section II discusses the practical implications of the
existing national and international regimes, in particular, their impact
on consumer health and industry competitiveness. Section III
evaluates possible solutions to address the issues raised. In the long-
term, an adjustment of the current U.S. state-centric approach to
sovereignty towards an approach characterized by increased
international linkages and leadership initiatives would aid in the
resolution of the key issues identified in the preceding sections. This
available at http://asbbs.org/files/2009/PDF/D/De%2OVaderC.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Go Scentless, Workers Warned After Lawsuit, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 15, 2010),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35871907/ns/business-usbusiness. See also Christy de
Vader, Fragrance in the Workplace: What Managers Need to Know, 3 J. MGMT. &
MARKETING RES. (2010), available at http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/09244.pdf
(for how to develop a scent-free policy in the workplace).
7. Vulser, supra note 3.
8. David Gutierrez, Cosmetics Products Routinely Formulated With Cancer-
Causing Chemicals, NATURAL NEWS (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.naturalnews.com
/021807_cosmetics chemicals-organics.html.
9. With the exception of perfume formulators, there is significant online
coverage in the U.S. of lawsuits regarding the use of scented products in the
workplace and coverage by non-profit interest groups regarding the lack of
involvement by the Federal government in cosmetic regulation. This note also
implies that, compared to the E.U., this greater U.S. coverage exists due to the
different regulatory systems.
10. This note uses the terms, "fragrances," "fragranced cosmetics," "fragranced
personal care products" and "perfumes" interchangeably.
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part then explores how, in the short term, the implementation of a
legislative approach such as that taken in Canada, could enhance the
U.S. framework.
II. Legal Context
A. Regulation of Fragranced Personal Care Products in the United
States
We're working on the honor system when it comes to cosmetics
safety . . . In the absence of federal standards, we have a huge range
of safety in the products we buy every day.
- Jane Houlihan"
In the U.S., cosmetics are regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)12 and are subject both to the federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) and the federal Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act (FPLA)." Perfumes and fragrances are classified as
cosmetics because they are "articles intended to be rubbed, poured,
sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied to the
human body or any part thereof for . .. promoting attractiveness." 1 4
The major controversy regarding the U.S. regulation of
fragrances concerns pre-market safety review and testing. Whereas
the FDA exerts considerable proactive control over drug
manufacturers, for cosmetics, on the other hand, it is the "firms
[which] are responsible for substantiating the safety of their products
and ingredients."" While with drugs, biologics, and medical devices
11. What You Should Know About Chemicals in Your Cosmetics, THE CAMPAIGN
FOR SAFE COSMETICS (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.safecosmetics.org/article.php?id=242
(Jane Houlihan was the vice president for research at the Environmental Working
Group (EWG), a research and advocacy group).
12. JAN VERNON & TOBE A. NWAOGU, RISK & POL'Y ANALYSTS LTD.,
COMPARATIVE STUDY ON COSMETICS LEGISLATION IN THE EU AND OTHER
PRINCIPAL MARKETS WITH SPECIAL ArrENTION TO SO-CALLED BORDERLINE
PRODUCTS 24-26 (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eulenterprise/newsroom/
cf/document.cfm?action=display&docjid=4557&userservice id=1&request.id=0.
(The Office of Colors and Cosmetics, within the FDA's Centre for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), governs cosmetic products.).
13. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fpla/outline.shtm [hereinafter FPLA]. The FPLA
provides the FDA with authority to "issue regulations requiring that all 'consumer
commodities' be labeled to disclose net contents, identity of commodity, and name
and place of business of the product's manufacturer, packer, or distributor."
14. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (2000).
15. FDA Authority Over Cosmetics, FDA, Mar. 3, 2005, http://www.fda.gov/
2011]1 225
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such tests must be presented before products can be marketed,16 with
cosmetics, the FDA may require tests after the fact and as a follow-up
to adverse reaction consumer complaints." Contrary to public
perception, the FDA has no statutory authority to require or enforce
18any type of pre-market review of cosmetic ingredients.
In addition, cosmetic firms also have, relative to food and drug
companies, significant flexibility in their labeling decisions." An
often-cited example is Section 1454(c)(3) of the FDCA, which
provides that the term "fragrance" may include an amalgam of
ingredients considered by the manufacturer to be part of the
fragrance formula. To determine what is meant by "amalgam" and
which ingredients may be captured under the term "fragrance,"
pursuant to Section 701.3 manufacturers must simply ensure that
labeling terms are "within the meaning as commonly understood by
consumers."2 0 In other words, manufacturers may exclude hundreds
of ingredients from being listed on the label if they can argue that a
consumer would interpret these ingredients to be part of the
fragrance formula. This facet of cosmetic labeling, subsuming
ingredients under the term "fragrance," is considered a significant
Cosmetics/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/ucm074162.htm. ("[The]
FDA's legal authority over cosmetics is different from other products regulated by
the agency, such as drugs, biologics, and medical devices. Cosmetic products and
ingredients are not subject to FDA premarket approval authority.") The principal
form of safety control the FDCA provides for cosmetic ingredients is through Section
601(a), which bans "adulterated" cosmetics generally. Stephen H. McNamara,
Regulation of Cosmetics in the United States-An Overview, THE COSMETIC INDUSTRY:
SCIENTIFIC AND REGULATORY FOUNDATIONS 3, 4-5 (Norman F. Estrin ed., 1984). A
cosmetic is deemed adulterated when "it bears or contains any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to users under the conditions of
use prescribed in the labeling thereof." FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000).
16. FDA Authority Over Cosmetics, FDA (Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.fda.gov
/Cosmetics/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/ucm074162.htm.
17. See id. ("[The] FDA takes regulatory action based upon agency priorities,
consistent with public health concerns and available resources.").
18. Judith E. Foulke, Cosmetic Ingredients: Understanding the Puffery, 26
FDACONSUMER (May 1992). This paper was written before success of the Safe
Cosmetics Act of 2010, presented to the House of Representatives on July 20, 2010,
was ascertained. Should this Act come into effect, the cosmetic regulation in the U.S.
would go through a profound change.
19. There is no labeling trade secret loophole for drug ingredients. Drugs have
patent protection, which fragrances do not have, and this, in addition to safety
concerns, likely alleviates the need for such a loophole.
20. As many authors point out, on its face, this does not create any bright line
standard for the perfume industry to follow. See FDA Cosmetic Labeling Rule, 21
C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (2007).
226 [Vol. 34:1
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aspect of protecting cosmetic trade secrets. Thus, unlike food and
drug manufacturers, who must list all ingredients, cosmetic
manufacturers are not required to make complete labeling disclosure.
Compared to other intellectual property protections, such as
copyright, patent, or trademark, trade secret law is the least
developed2 1 and therefore the most difficult to enforce. The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (hereinafter
"Restatement") defines a trade secret as "any information that can be
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise . . . that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
economic advantage over others."22 One of the principal goals of
trade secret protection is to permit owners to "capture returns from
their successful innovations" by encouraging research investments.
Copying products which are protected by trade secret law and using
reverse engineering, such as discovery through "fair and honest
means"2 is generally permitted.25 For liability to be found, courts
confine their analyses to the determination of whether the acquirer
resorted to improper means.26
Canadian scholar Vanessa Mackie, like many others, believes
that in light of the expanding global marketplace, fragrance
manufacturers require enhanced legislation to protect their scents.27
With recent technological innovations competitors increasingly
reverse-engineer fragrance formulas to produce similar products,
which may be sold at substantially lower prices28 to the original
21. Betty Bridges, FDA 'Regulation' of Cosmetics & Fragrances, OUR LITTLE
PLACE, http://www.ourlittleplace.com/fda.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2008) (explaining
that where fragrance formulas consist of trade secrets, the ingredients of the
fragrance do not have to be revealed).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 (1995).
23. Delia Gervin, You Can Stand Under My Umbrella: Weighing Trade Secret
Protection Against the Need for Greater Transparency in Perfume and Fragranced
Product Labeling, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 322 (2008).
24. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
25. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 250 (1998).
26. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[1] 1-22.4-23 (M.
Bender ed., 2010) (1967).
27. Vanessa Mackie, Scent Marks: The Future of Canadian Trade-mark Law, 18
INTELL. PROP. J. 417, 442 (2005).
28. Olivier Banchereau, Protection of Fragrances, 13 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 3
(2007) ([T]oday's technical means make it easier to analyze the compounds of
fragrances, which makes the "fraudulent misappropriation of the fragrance's
formula" less of an issue).
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designer's detriment. One recourse fragrance designers presently
have is to employ complex blends of natural oils, which are harder to
reverse engineer than synthetics.29 However, due to the high cost of
natural oils, and the fact that they are often considered inferior
ingredients in perfume, manufacturers are less likely to use these
ingredients, and so are unlikely to avoid the loss of trade secrets in
this manner.'o Given the unevenness of the court's protection of
fragrance formulae, Mackie's recommendation is to protect
fragrances through more stringent intellectual property legislation.
Because unlisted ingredients are permitted in fragranced
cosmetics, public interest groups, such as the Environmental Working
Group (EWG), have pointed out the negative implications for
consumer safety.32 The proposed alternative, which would entail new
legislation requiring fragrance manufacturers to disclose all of the
individual ingredients on labels, would likely result in an
unconstitutional taking, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.33 Because
fragrance formulae are considered private property, a forced
disclosure of all the ingredients comprising the fragrance, would
require government compensation.' Some argue the merits of an
exception to the taking rule in cases where public health or welfare is
at stake. However, the courts have yet to rule conclusively on this
issue. Legal scholars are deeply divided on trade secret and labeling
issues, underscoring the entrenched nature of the debate. It is
therefore unlikely that a change in U.S. intellectual property law will
be forthcoming in the near future. Section III of this note discusses
29. Thomas J. Field, Copyright Protection for Perfumes, 45 IDEA 19, 25 (2004).
30. Id.
31. Mackie, supra note 27, at 442.
32. HEATHER SARANTIS ET AL., CAMPAIGN FOR SAFE COSMETICS AND THE
ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, NOT So SEXY: HIDDEN CHEMICALS IN PERFUME AND
COLOGNE (2010), available at http://www.ewg.org/files/SafeCosmetics
FragranceRpt.pdf.
33. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-4 (1984) (held that trade
secrets qualify, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as private
property); see also Gervin, supra note 23, at 320.
34. See U.S. Const. Amend. V. See also Gervin, supra note 23, at 330 n.105; FDA
Regulations, infra note 105 (for an explanation).
35. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See also Gervin, supra note 23, at
341 ("[S]tates have police power to regulate for the common good, despite concerns
of depriving the property owner of beneficial use."); see also Gervin, supra note 23, at
334 (citing the provision that private property is "held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community.").
228 [Vol. 34:1
Fragrant or Foul?
alternative solutions for some of these issues, which may be more
practical and expedient than intellectual property law reform, such as
that recommended by Mackie.
It is not only legal academics and nongovernmental organizations
who have focused on the labeling loophole. The cosmetic industry
itself is taking steps to alleviate consumer concerns. Since the 1970s
there has been a growth in the creation of industry-sponsored
organizations with a view to controlling the quality of fragranced
products.36 Prominent organizations now include the Personal Care
Products Council (PCPC)37 and the Independent Cosmetic
Manufacturers and Distributors (ICMAD)." These organizations are
industry trade associations with the goals of maintaining
competitiveness and assuring product safety." In addition to funding
studies to test the safety and effectiveness of controversial cosmetic
ingredients, these associations provide their members with test results
to ensure that all ingredients, including undisclosed ingredients, are
safe for consumers.40
Consumer groups, however, object to the fact that the federal
government has not stepped in, but has allowed industry groups to
take on the primary safeguarding role. With respect to the PCPC and
ICMAD, public-health interest groups point out that any safety
studies distributed to members merely represent suggestions and are
36. While the PCPC was established originally as the Manufacturing Perfumers'
Association in 1880, the ICMAD was created in 1974. The Personal Care Products
Council was Founded as Manufacturing Perfumers' Association, PERS. CARE
PRODUCTS COUNCIL, http://www.personalcarecouncil.org/personal-care-products-
council-was-founded-manufacturing-perfumers-association (last visited Sept. 20,
2010); Timeline, INDEP. COSMETIC MANUFACTURERS & DISTRIBUTERS,
http://www.icmad.org /about/history.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). The IFRA was
created in 1973. Frances J. Storrs, Allergen of the Year: Fragrance, 18 DERMATITIS 3-
7 (2007), available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/559985-6 (password
protected link; search for link listed above in Google for access).
37. Formerly, the Cosmetic, Toiletry & Fragrance Association (CTFA).
38. See About ICMAD, INDEP. COSMETIC MANUFACTURERS & DISTRIBUTORS,
http://www.icmad.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
39. Personal Care Products Council home page, PERS. CARE PRODUCTS COUNCIL,
http://www.personalcarecouncil.org/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2010) ("The highest
priority for personal care products companies is the safety and health of consumers of
all ages who use and enjoy our products.").
40. Referring also to quality assurance guidelines. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra
note 12, at 25-26. See also Consumer Commitment Code, PERS. CARE PRODUCTS
COUNCIL, http://www.personalcarecouncil.org/science-safety/consumer-commitment-
code (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
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not binding.41 There are also no systematic means of gauging whether
members are adhering to the findings of the industry studies.
Recognizing that consumers require additional assurance that
cosmetics are safe for use, however, the FDA worked with the PCPC
to establish two additional mechanisms for cosmetic regulation: the
Voluntary Cosmetics Regulation Program (VCRP) and the Cosmetic
Ingredient Review (CIR).42 The CIR was established following the
FDA's conclusion that while it had the funding for stringent pre-
market testing and safety requirements imposed on drugs, it did not
have the resources available to do the same for cosmetics.43 The
CIR's role is to catalogue and classify cosmetic ingredients as either
safe for use, safe under limited circumstances, or unsafe." Like the
PCPC and ICMAD, the CIR is industry-sponsored.45  The
effectiveness of the CIR and the VCRP in protecting consumer health
by controlling the safety of all ingredients is subject to doubt for the
same reason as studies by the trade associations - namely that the
safety conclusions for the CIR are not legally binding on
manufacturers.46 Moreover, because participation in these programs
is voluntary, manufacturers are under no legal obligation to submit
adverse reaction reports47 or even to submit novel ingredients for
*48review.
To summarize, there are at least three issues with respect to
cosmetic regulation that government, consumers, and industry are
attempting to address, but they are doing so in an uncoordinated
manner. First, there are concerns about the lower standard of FDA
oversight of cosmetics as compared to its oversight of food and drugs.
This discrepancy is based on the fact that the FDA does not require
the submission of safety tests prior to sale. Second, because the
41. Mark Shapiro, New Power for 'Old Europe,' THE NATION, Dec. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Europe/NewPowerOldEurope.html.
42. Deborah E. Mason, Kiss and Make-Up: A Need for Consolidation of FDA




44. General Information, COSMETIC INGREDIENT REVIEW, http://www.cir-safety.
org/info.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
45. See id.
46. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 19.




current intellectual property framework provides trade secret
protection for fragrance formulae, consumers are worried about the
impact of "hidden" ingredients. Manufacturers, on the other hand,
are concerned that more stringent labeling would provide their
competitors with an unfair advantage and result in an unlawful
taking. Finally, the informal methods and industry-sponsored
organizations created to fill gaps in the oversight regime generate
questions of accountability, particularly because they are not
enforceable. As discussed in Section III, there are also implications
for U.S. sovereignty.
B. European Union Fragrance Regulations
The notion of a European regulator in Brussels who can make the
Americans tremble in their boots is fairly attractive to us.
- Professor Norman Davies4 9
There are numerous distinctions between the U.S. and the E.U.
regime governing fragranced personal care products. These
distinctions raise issues for each jurisdiction as well as issues with
respect to the effect of each regime on the other.
In the E.U., cosmetics are regulated by the European
Community Cosmetics Directiveo (hereinafter "Directive").
Cosmetic products are defined as, "any substance or preparation
intended for placing in contact with the various external parts of the
human body . . . perfuming them or protecting them in order to keep
them in good condition, change their appearance or correct body
odours."" Fragrances fall clearly under this definition.
In light of technical advancement and new scientific safety
findings, the Directive has undergone seven amendments and thirty-
one adaptations since 1976.2 This systematic amendment process
reflects a primary difference in the approach of each jurisdiction. The
U.S. FDCA, created in 1938, has "remained largely unchanged except
for the Color Additive Amendments of 1960."" It is only this year
that a serious attempt has been made to update the current
49. T.R. REID, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE: THE NEW SUPERPOWER AND
THE END OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY 109 (2004) (Davies is an expert on Eastern
European history at Oxford).
50. Council Directive 76/768, 1976 O.J. (L 262) (EEC).
51. Id. at art. 1.1.
52. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 19.
53. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 24.
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framework. On July 20, 2010, three U.S. House of Representative
members introduced the HR 5786, the Safe Cosmetics Act of 2010.54
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether this
legislation will be passed or its implications, but it is important to note
that it has taken more than seventy years for a substantial review and
proposed changes to come before the House."
The Directive is unlike the FDCA because it was designed to
govern all E.U. member countries, and is implemented in each
country though national legislation.56 In addition to following the
Directive, each country may develop unique safeguarfds and
procedures concerning cosmetic regulation in their jurisdiction. The
member countries are responsible for designating "competent
authorities" to assure the safety and compliance with regulations
through in-market surveillance." By comparison, the FDCA has no
legislation in place requiring individual states to monitor their
cosmetic safety or to complement federal legislation with additional
safeguards.
The E.U. has a greater range of consumer safeguards. Unlike
the FDCA, for instance, the Seventh Amendment to the Directive
mandates the disclosure of twenty-six fragrance allergens in the
ingredient listing, regardless of whether they are part of the fragrance
formula." There is also a mandatory disclosure requirement on labels
for ingredients exceeding 0.01percent in rinse-off or 0.001 percent in
leave-on product." There are no similar U.S. expectations.
Another significant distinction concerns ingredient classification.
First, the E.U. has a list of banned ingredients that numbers well over
1,000 chemicals.6 It also has a positive list of ingredients that are
known to be safe, which manufacturers may examine if they are
unsure of the status of desired ingredients.61 Second, to cover
54. H.R. 5786, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=lllcong-bills&docid=f:h5786ih.txt.pdf.
55. Just Introduced: The Safe Cosmetics Act of 2010, THE CAMPAIGN FOR SAFE
COSMETICS, http://www.safecosmetics.org/section.php?id=74.
56. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12.
57. Id. at 21.
58. Carl Geffken, Fragrance Regulations Demystified, GCI MAGAZINE, (Aug. 28,
2008), http://www.gcimagazine.comlbusiness/rd/regulatory/27628479.html.
59. Council Directive, supra note 50, at annex III, pt. 1.
60. Id. at annex II, III.




untested and new ingredients, there is a general ban on ingredients
known or suspected of causing cancer, genetic mutations, or birth
defects.62 In comparison, the U.S. list of banned materials only
includes fifteen chemicals. 63 The U.S. does not have a safe ingredient
list nor a general ban on harmful substances. 4
The E.U. also provides more comprehensive regulation of
specific ingredients and processes. For instance, there is a significant
controversy about phthalates. Non-profit groups have stated that
"two of the most toxic phthalates, DBP and DEHP, have been
banned from cosmetics products sold in the European Union (E.U.)
but remain unregulated in the U.S." 65 The E.U. also banned animal
testing for cosmetic ingredients and the sale of cosmetic ingredients
tested on animals.66 The most recent E.U. addition to consumer
health protection is a regulation that "imposes specific requirements
on nanomaterials," 67 which are compounds believed to pass through
skin barriers and alter cell structure.6 The new requirements include
/safety-in-cosmetics/safety.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
62. Council Regulation 1223/2009, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 30 November 2009 on Cosmetic Products, pmbl., 1 32, 2009 O.J. (L 342)
61, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L
:2009:342:0059:0209:EN:PDF. The classification of substances as CMR is made
pursuant to Council Regulation 1272/2008, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 December 2008 on Classification, Labeling and Packaging of
Substances and Mixtures, Amending and Repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and
1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, Annex I, 2009 O.J. (L
353) 104, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=OJ:L:2008:353:0001:1355:EN:PDF, which considers substances as hazardous not
only if the ingredient is "known or presumed" to be carcinogenic for instance, but
also if it is suspected of being carcinogenic.
63. The fifteen banned ingredients include biothionol, hexachlorophene, mercury
compounds, vinyl chloride and zirconium salts in aerosol products, halogenated
salicylanides, chloroform and methylene chloride. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note
12, at 25. See also Walgreen Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 No-Act. LEXIS 638,
at *11 (Oct. 13, 2006).
64. Id. The FDCA does not reference a list of ingredients approved for use in
cosmetics. McNamara, supra note 15, at 4.
65. Tracy Fernandez Rysavy, The Ugly Side of Cosmetics, GREEN AMERICA
(May/June 2005), httpJ/www.greenamericatoday.org/pubs/realgreen/articles/cosmetics.cfm.
66. Koen G. Berden et al., Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Invest-
ment - An Economic Analysis, Final Report for European Commission, Directorate-
General for Trade, OJ 2007/S 180-219493, Dec. 11, 2009, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc 145613.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Maryann Marshall, The Dangers of Nanoparticles, NATURAL NEWS (Nov. 26,
2008), http://www.naturalnews.com/024916_nanoparticles-health-cancer.html.
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premarket notification to the regulatory authorities and the labeling
of cosmetics known to include such materials.6 9 The U.S. has does not
have equivalent protections in place. The Safe Cosmetics Act of 2010
would address some of these divergences, but it has not been passed
and is being met with industry resistance.70
There are also key distinctions with respect to each jurisdiction's
regulatory bodies. Whereas the American CIR is funded by the
cosmetic industry, the E.U. created and funds the Scientific
Committee of Cosmetics and Non-Food Products Intended for
Consumers (SCCNFP).7' All E.U. Member States are represented on
the SCCNFP.72 The SCCNFP's role is to evaluate ingredient safety in
light of technological innovation and to issue safety testing
guidelines.7 ' Based on the SCCNFP's findings, Member States then
decide whether to include the subject substance on their cosmetic
directive lists.74 Manufacturers must seek the SCCNFP's approval
before using a new ingredient subject to the positive lists." The major
distinction between the U.S. CIR and VCRP, is that the SCCNFP's
decisions are more likely to become binding on manufacturers. The
SCCNFP's decisions, therefore, go beyond the voluntary
recommendations made by the U.S. organizations and generate
enforceable legal authority.
69. Berden, supra note 66, at 69.
70.
We are concerned that the Safe Cosmetics Act of 2010 as written is not
based on credible and established scientific principles, would put an
enormous if not impossible burden on FDA, and would create a mammoth
new regulatory structure for cosmetics, parts of which would far exceed that
of any other FDA-regulated product category including food or drugs. The
measures the bill would mandate are likely unachievable even with the
addition of hundreds of additional FDA scientists and millions more in
funding and would not make a meaningful contribution to product safety.
Statement by Lezlee Westine, President and CEO of PCPC, Personal Care Products
Council Response to Safe Cosmetics Act of 2010, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Aug. 3,
2010), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/196526.php [hereinafter PCPC
Response to SCA].
71. Members must submit declarations of confidentiality and independence. Vera
Rogiers, Contribution of the SCCNFP to the Three Rs, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
RESEARCH, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/info/conferences/rrr/ppt/
rogiers.pdf. Approximately thirty countries have adopted variations of these lists.
VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 5.
72. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 20 n.5.
73. Rogiers, supra note 71; VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 38.
74. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 38.
75. Id. at 42.
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There are, however, at least two major similarities between the
two systems. Like the U.S., the E.U. does not require pre-market
approval of cosmetic products manufactured within or imported into
their territory.76 Moreover, the Directive also provides that
"perfumes and aromatic compositions and their raw materials shall be
referred to by the word 'perfume' or 'flavor.""' Perfumes and
aromatic compounds are not regarded as ingredients pursuant to the
Directive. Just as in the U.S., such provisions are designed to
protect trade secrets and thereby allow manufacturers to omit certain
ingredients from the label. In the E.U., however, there are exceptions
to this rule, such as for allergens."
As seen, the E.U. Directive continues to evolve with
contemporary scientific developments, and is also more expansive
and stringent than the FDCA regime. Because it applies to all
member states, the Directive may be supplemented by additional
safeguards. The trade secret provision, while permitted under the
Directive, does allow labeling disclosure by exception for allergens
and establishes a threshold for leave-on and rinse-off products. The
E.U.'s classification of ingredients is also more comprehensive. Both
the number of banned ingredients and the subtleties of ingredient
usage are outlined. In response to contemporary consumer concerns,
such as those regarding phthalates and animal testing, the Directive is
more proactive in its approach.
C. International Industry Self-Regulation
Both the U.S. and the E.U. national governments have gaps in
the regulation of their cosmetic industries, in particular regarding
trade secret protection. To reassure consumers, numerous
international organizations have been created to control the quality
of fragranced personal care products. While some scholars assert
that, through a "highly developed industry code of practice,"a
76. Id. at 19.
77. Directive 2003/15, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
February 2003 Amending Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the Approximation of
the Laws of the Member States Relating to Cosmetic Products, art. 6(g), 2003 O.J. (L
66) 30 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2003:066:0026:0035:EN:PDF
78. Id. at 29.
79. See above paragraphs.
80. Mathias Vey, Fragrance Safety and Evaluation, GCI MAGAZINE (Sept. 5,
2008), http://www.gcimagazine.com/marketstrends/segments/fragrance/2791853 4 .htm
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industry is better able to react to safety findings than national or
global regulators, there are key issues raised by extensive,
international self-regulation. The PCPC and ICMAD in the U.S., and
the E.U.'s principal trade group, Colipa," are industry associations
operating within each jurisdiction, while the organizations discussed
in this section operate internationally.
Even though NGOs stress the lack of national governmental
oversight and the resultant internationalization of industry regulation,
there is a potentially more significant issue less-commonly referenc-
ed - the lack of U.S. involvement as an industry leader and
international actor. While the E.U. is maintaining a leadership role
both in revenue and in regulation, and is now competing with the
rising Asian markets, the U.S. is comparatively unresponsive.
1. The International Fragrance Association
The International Fragrance Association (IFRA) represents
regional and national fragrance associations internationally." Its
stated mission is to "promot[e] the safety and benefits of the
fragrance industry's products."" To do so, the IFRA publishes
Standards that member companies are required to follow when
manufacturing their fragranced goods. These Standards are
considered to be the industry "risk management" system."
The IFRA, like the CIR and the SCCFNFP promulgates a list of
chemicals believed to be dangerous to consumers." The major
concern with the IFRA's effectiveness in protecting consumers is that
the list is only available on subscription by manufacturers and is not
available to the public or to governments for review.8 Some analysts
state that the Standards have had a minimal impact on safety because
of the safety-test results are quite cursory and are cited from
unpublished articles.' While the IFRA asserts that there is "100%
I?page=3.
81. About Us, COLIPA, http://www.colipa.eu/about-colipa-the-european-cosmetic-
cosmetics-association.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
82. IFRA Membership, INT'L FRAGRANCE REGULATION Ass'N, http://www.
ifraorg.org/public/index-ps/parentid/1/childid/2 (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
83. Id.
84. Vey, supra note 80.
85. Id.
86. SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF COSMETICS IN EUROPE, 36 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN




compliance [by industry] with IFRA Standards,"" this statement was
based on a study of fifty personal care products, sourced from
different countries.89  This pan-European enforcement approach
assesses compliance by pulling the fifty samples from ten different
countries." Thus, there are concerns about the transparency and
effectiveness of the IFRA process, which raises reliability issues for
consumers.
2. The Research Institute for Fragrance Materials
The IFRA is supported by the Research Institute for Fragrance
Materials (RIFM), which is also funded by the fragrance industry.1 A
principal component of RIFM in turn is the RIFM Expert Panel
(REXPAN), made up of "independent experts"" who evaluate
fragrance safety data.3 When REXPAN discovers an ingredient that
is unsafe for consumers, it informs the IFRA, which then includes the
item in a list of restricted or banned materials.94 While this method is
intended to enhance safety, as noted, because the list is only available
upon subscription, provides little guidance to manufacturers, and
possesses no governmental endorsement, its effectiveness can be
questioned. Thus, many consumers maintain this is also an ineffective
safeguard.
3. The International Cooperation on Cosmetic Regulation
Unlike the IFRA, whose members are individual companies, the
International Cooperation on Cosmetic Regulation (ICCR) is a
multilateral framework.95 It was created by cosmetic regulatory
88. About Us, INT'L FRAGRANCE REGULATION Ass'N, http://www.ifraorg.org
/Home/About-us/page.aspx/4 (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
89. IFRA performs this study every year, and the fifty products are selected from
ten countries. See Press Release: Latest IFRA Standards to have little effect on
perfumers' palette, INT'L FRAGRANCE REGULATION Ass'N (Jun. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.ifraorg.org/files/documentspublished/l/en-us/PR/22325_PR_2010_06_02
LatestIFRAStandardsto havelittleeffect-on_ perfumers.pdf [hereinafter IFRA
Press Release].
90. Id. at 2.
91. Vey, supra note 80, at 2.
92. Id. They are not supposed to have any connection to the fragrance industry.
93. Smith et al., Regulatory Notes, Roles in the Safe Use of Fragrance Materials,
RESEARCH INST. FOR FRAGRANCE MATERIALS, INC. 1, Jan./Feb. 2005, available at
http://www.rifm.org/doc/rolesinthesafeuseoffragrancematerials_1.pdf
94. Id. at 1-2.
95. Terms of Reference for ICCR, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/International
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authorities from the U.S., the E.U., Canada, and Japan as a forum for
their national trade associations to participate in a dialogue on global
industry issues.6 The ICCR focuses both on protecting consumers
and on minimizing trade barriers." It was set up in 2007,98 so an
assessment of the success in the ICCR discussions is premature. In
addition, given that the regulatory requirements in each jurisdiction
are quite variable, and that the ICCR is a framework which does not
issue binding recommendations, reliance on the ICCR to protect
consumers is not possible, at least in the short term. There is also no
ICCR-specific website and the regulatory authorities from each
jurisdiction post virtually identical, sparse outcome summaries.
Given this paucity of publicly available information, a thorough
analysis concerning the effectiveness of ICCR is not possible.
Despite the dearth of available ICCR material, based on the
regulators' outcome summaries, it appears little progress has been
made concerning the implementation of harmonized regulations. A
stated goal of the 2007 ICCR Meeting Report was to develop a
common definition for nanotechnology." In 2010, however, this issue
still seems unresolved.'" When reviewing the Meeting Reports, it is
evident that both regulators and industry are sharing information and
- 101are even, in some cases, creating new, specialized working groups.
Nevertheless, regarding regulatory harmonization, these Reports
merely mention that regulators, "will continue to cooperate," "will
review information," and have "shared information."'" Additionally,
because of the differences among the regulators and trade
associations themselves, a consensus decision regarding harmonized
personal care product regulation is not likely to occur in the short
term.
Programs/HarmonizationInitiatives/ucm114522.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
96. International Cooperation on Cosmetic Regulation, ICCR-2 Press Statement,
INT'L COOPERATION ON COSMETIC REG., available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise
/sectors/cosmetics/files/doc/outcomeiccr_2008_en.pdf [hereinafter Press Statement].
97. Id.
98. Terms of Reference for ICCR, supra note 95.
99. For a list of outcome summaries, see Meeting Reports, HEALTH CANADA,
http://www.hc-sc.gc.calcps-spc/person/cosmet/info-ind-prof/iccr-eng.php (last visited
Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Meeting Reports].
100. International Cooperation on Cosmetic Regulation, Outcome of the Meeting
held July 13-15, 2010, HEALTH CANADA, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/cps-spc/person/
cosmet/info-ind-prof/iccr_2010-eng.php. (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
101. Press Statement, supra note 96.
102. Meeting Reports, supra note 99.
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The ICCR's goals are commendable. Harmonizing regulations
and involving both governmental authorities and industry
representatives in a joint dialogue may yet yield results in the future.
Because the ICCR is a "framework," however, and does not issue
binding recommendations, at least in the short term, the viability of
relying on the ICCR to protect consumers is impractical.03 In the
meantime, there are still gaps and issues that need to be addressed.
These will be discussed in Section III.
III. Practical Issues
A. Implications of the Current Cosmetic Regime for Consumers
On any given day, a consumer may use as many as 25 different
cosmetic products. If each of these products contains 10 different
ingredients, this consumer could easily be exposed to more than
200 different chemical compounds.
- Perry Romanowski04
Consumer safety groups claim the lack of a coordinated, state-
monitored system of fragrance regulation is having a deleterious
effect on consumer health.os Because national governments do not
require the submission of pre-market safety tests and allow for
labeling loopholes, there are risks of harm to consumers." In a letter
to former FDA Commissioner, Richard Wiles, the Environmental
Working Group (EWG) wrote that they "found over 400 products
containing ingredients that cosmetic industry safety panels have
found unsafe when used as directed on product labels."'O To add
further concern, the Campaign for Safe Cosmetics (CSC) claimed that
the FDA has conducted safety studies on phthalates but is not
releasing the results to the public.'08
103. Id.
104. Perry Romanowski, Fundamentals of Cosmetic Product Safety Testing, 111
COSMETICS AND TOILETRIES 79, (1996).
105. FDA Regulations, THE CAMPAIGN FOR SAFE COSMETICS, http://www.
safecosmetics.org/section.php?id=75 (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
106. Id.
107. Letter from the Environmental Working Group to Andrew C. von
Eschenbach, former FDA Commissioner (Sept. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.ewg.org //files/EWGviolanalysis.pdf.
108. FDA Finds Chemicals Linked to Birth Defects in Two-Thirds of Cosmetics
Products, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (April 6, 2005), available at http://www.foe.org/fda-
finds-chemicals-linked-birth-defects-two-thirds-cosmetics-products.
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Some synthetic fragrance materials cited as the primary off-label
ingredients have been found in human fat tissue and breast milk.'*
Other studies demonstrate the dangers of non-synthetic substances,
such as formaldehyde and phthalates, which are believed to cause
damage to the liver, kidney, and reproductive system.n0 It is not the
goal of this paper to assess the quality of the industry and the CSC's
scientific analyses, but it should be noted that approximately eighty-
to-ninety percent of all fragrance chemicals are now synthesized,"'
and that these may well be safer for consumers than many natural
ingredients."2 According to one journalist, the perfume industry is
"blindly and adamantly convinced that the public will only buy
perfumes it believes to be 'natural"' and that it makes every effort to
suppress this fact - not because synthetics are harmful, but because
the "public can't handle the truth.""'
The differences between the U.S. and E.U. fragrance regulations
and misconceptions concerning individual ingredients may lead
consumers to conclude that E.U. products, as a result of more
comprehensive labeling and testing requirements, are safer.114 Paul
Kahn believes that "for many around the world, the question is how
to become more like the Europeans, which means less like the
Americans.".. In practice, however, even E.U. products have been
found to contain proscribed chemicals.'16 Test results revealed, for
109. Gerhard G. Rimkus, Polycyclic Musk Fragrances in Human Adipose Tissue
and Human Milk, 33 CHEMOSPHERE 2033 (1996).
110. Take a Whiff of This, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org
/cro/promos/shopping/shopsmart/winter-2007/what-you-should-know-about-chemicals-
in-your-cosmetics/fragrance-testing/0701_cosmetics.fragrance.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2010) (found that of all the fragrances tested, all contained at least two phthalates
banned in Europe).
111. A Closer Look at the Industry, FRAGRANCED PRODUCTS INFORMATION
NETWORK (Jan. 7,2009), http://www.fpinva.org/text/1a5d908-94.html.
112. Naturals cause more allergies because they have a greater number of
impurities than synthetics, which are isolated scent molecules, repeatedly tested for
consistently nonallergenic response.
113. CHANDLER BURR, THE PERFECT SCENT: A YEAR INSIDE THE PERFUME
INDUSTRY IN PARIS AND NEW YORK 117-119 (2007).
114. European Laws, THE CAMPAIGN FOR SAFE COSMETICS, http://www.
safecosmetics.org/article.php?id=346 (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
115. Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259, 264
(2004).
116. JOSEPH DIGANGI ET AL., PRETTY NASTY - PHTHALATES IN EUROPEAN




example, that despite being banned, phthalates were still found in top
European fragrances."' Interestingly, many consumers also associate
the allegedly harmful synthetics with U.S. brands and natural
ingredients with European brands."' As perfume journalist Chandler
Burr points out, however, at least with respect to synthetics in
fragrances, entirely the opposite is true."' Guerlain, a venerable
French perfume house, for example, was at the "forefront of the
synthetic revolution," as far back as 1889, and long before many U.S.
cosmetic manufacturers were established.120 Another notable French
perfume, Chanel No. 5, is structured around aldehyde, a synthetic
molecule first developed in France in the nineteenth century.'21 It
seems that the U.S. brand may be suffering due, at least in part, to
serious consumer misconceptions. Adjusting the current regulatory
scheme to assure consumers that the U.S. government is providing
appropriate oversight would add credibility to U.S. goods.
B. Business Implications
I do not accept the imposition of U.S. standards on our firms ...
The EU will regulate its own businesses.
- Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkesteinl22
As suggested above, it is not only consumer health groups that
point out the apparent lack of U.S. oversight of cosmetics, it is also, as
author Mark Shapiro articulates,123 business interests, as they, too, are
jeopardized by the dearth of U.S. regulation. The perceived
inadequacy of U.S. cosmetic regulation contributes to a devaluation
of U.S. products. For instance, lower standards for toxicity screening
in the U.S., "riskis] sacrificing the European market, which, with 450
million people, is now larger than that of the United States."124 In
sales of cosmetics alone, about 7 percent of all cosmetic products in
the U.S. are imported from the E.U., which amounts to almost three
117. Id.
118. BURR, supra note 113, at 123.
119. BURR, supra note 113, at 123.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 118.
122. Audit of Company Accounts: Commission Sets Out Ten Priorities to Improve
Quality and Protect Investors, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, IP/03/715, May 21, 2003,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/715&format=HTML
&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION].
123. Shapiro, supra note 41.
124. Id.
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billion dollars each year. 125 U.S. exports to the E.U., on the other
hand, only amount to approximately $1.5 billion each year.'26 With
Asia set to overtake the E.U. as the largest cosmetic market by
2014,127 the U.S. may wish to adjust its regulations to reassure
consumers that American products are safe. The perfume business is
a fifteen billion dollar industry.'" To take advantage of this, the U.S.
will need to counter the increasing preference for foreign goods.
While the E.U. and U.S. are making efforts to harmonize their
cosmetic legislation,'29 the two jurisdictions benefit disproportionately
from such changes. The E.U. commissioned a comprehensive
analysis of "the ways in which regulatory requirements affect the
competitiveness of the cosmetics industry.""o By implementing the
new Directive requirements, the analysts estimated gains of between
forty million and two billion dollars per year."' The U.S., on the
other hand had negative growth in the cosmetics sector from 2008-
09.132 The E.U. also incurs a greater benefit from the implementation
of non-tariff measures (NTM), non-price or quantity trade
restrictions, in the cosmetic industry.'3 ' The elimination of NTMs in
the cosmetics sector would increase production in the E.U., while
decreasing the output in the U.S. 134
Because the E.U. has banned more than 1,000 ingredients,
compared to fifteen in the U.S., manufacturers following the E.U.
standards are more likely to be able to sell to U.S. markets than U.S.
manufacturers following primarily the U.S. rules are able to sell to
125. EU Strengthens Cooperation with US on Cosmetics and Medical Devices,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, IP/07/1024, (Jul. 5, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1024&guiLanguage=en.
126. Id.
127. Carrie Lennard, State of the Industry, GCI MAGAZINE (Jun. 3, 2010),
http://www.gcimagazine.com/marketstrends/regions/world/95547169.html.
128. DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: How LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 139 (2007).
129. International Activities, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/International
Activities/default.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
130. Id.
131. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 122, at 40.
132. Lennard, supra note 127.
133. Berden et al., supra note 66, at 70 ("The chemicals, cosmetics &
pharmaceuticals sector (taken together here for data reasons) sees the E.U. gain
more than the US."). See also id. at xvi.
134. Berden et al., supra note 66, at xvi. The paper also concludes that "dynamic
investment effects" could mitigate the US short-term losses.
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E.U. markets."' This regulatory arbitrage"' allows multinational
corporations to "choose from a menu of ... trading environments,
designed for their competitive advantage."l37
Different market results also arise from different U.S. and E.U.
cosmetic definitions. The U.S. definition was developed when there
was little cosmetic variety,3 whereas the E.U. definition, developed
more recently in 1976, is continuously updated to reflect technological
and scientific development. 139 Because the U.S. has maintained the
same definition since 1938, new products are often classified as drugs,
and are thereby subject to more stringent controls. 140  This
classification discrepancy between the U.S. and E.U. allows the E.U.
to classify a larger number of new products under the more lenient
and simpler cosmetic regulation regime.14 On the one hand, the E.U.
cosmetic regulatory regime is more stringent than that in the U.S.,
which boosts consumer confidence. On the other hand, the E.U. is
more likely than the U.S. to characterize personal care products as
cosmetics, rather than as drugs, which are subject to more exacting
regulations. This regulatory difference means that for many
borderline products, the E.U. is also a more favorable market than
the U.S.
The fragranced personal care products industry is a lucrative one
and the E.U. is making efforts to protect consumer safety as well as to
135. What You Should Know About the Chemicals in Your Cosmetics, CAMPAIGN
FOR SAFE COSMETICS (Jan. 2007), http://www.safecosmetics.org/article.php?id=242.
See also Berden et al., supra note 66, at 70 (On the other hand, because in the U.S.
relatively few products may be classified as cosmetics, many E.U. products are
considered over-the-counter drugs and are thus subject to more exacting regulations).
136. Regulatory Arbitrage, HEDGE FUNDS ASSOCIATION 2, http://www.hedge-
funds-association.com/14_RegulatoryArbitrage.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
Arbitrage is the "practice of taking advantage of the difference between two of more
markets." Id. Usually the difference taken advantage of is price, but any difference
may be used. When evaluating the different markets, firms consider both capital
requirements and administrative burdens. Id. at 3.
137. Christopher Marsden, Cyberlaw and International Political Economy:
Towards Regulation of the Global Information Society, L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 355,
420 (2001).
138. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 37.
139. Id.
140. Is it a Cosmetic, a Drug, or Both? (Or is it Soap?), FDA (Jul. 8, 2002),
http://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/ucm074201.
htm. Products can be classified both as cosmetics and as drugs when they a) meet
both definitions and b) have two intended uses.
141. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 37.
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improve business prospects.142 According to their own analysis, the
E.U. is succeeding in both of these key respects.13 To compete and
maintain a presence as a significant fragrance manufacturer, the U.S.
will need to provide greater oversight to dissuade the current
regulatory arbitrage.
IV. Possible Short and Long Term Solutions
A. Reconceptualization of U.S. Sovereignty
The E.U. now has 'more people, more wealth, and more trade than
the United States - and more influence in almost every
international body.'
- T .R. Reid1 4 4
Parts I and II of this paper highlighted areas where the U.S. is
both less active in national cosmetic regulation and in international
regulatory initiatives than the E.U. In Part I, we saw that while the
E.U.'s Directive reflects current scientific findings, the FDCA has not
been substantively updated for cosmetics since 1938. We also saw
that while the U.S. lacks an authoritative, government-administered
cosmetic ingredient review board, the E.U. developed and works with
the SCCNFP, which is comprised of member-state representatives,
appointed by the E.U. Commission.145 While the E.U. Directive
classifies products as either a drug or a cosmetic, but not both, the
U.S. allows for dual classification. This means that U.S.
manufacturers must follow more stringent guidelines when selling to
U.S. markets than to E.U. markets.
International, industry-sponsored organizations do have an
impact on the nature and scope of national regulation. The E.U. also
has more influence in these bodies than the U.S. To quantify the
effects of such a discrepancy, in Section II we saw that the E.U.
fragranced personal care product market is growing, whereas the U.S.
market contracted." There are also accountability issues in the U.S.
as consumers believe both government and industry are failing in
their duty to keep consumers well-informed by permitting labeling
142. Id.
143. See generally arguments made in this section; see also id.
144. REID, supra note 49, at 228.
145. VERNON & NWAOGU, supra note 12, at 20.




loopholes. Consumers appear to be trusting E.U. products to the
detriment of American goods.
Due to the undercurrent of government inactivity, the author
believes these examples fundamentally reflect a sovereignty issue.
There are many competing definitions of sovereignty. This paper
relies on the following definition, based on the United Nations
General Assembly's interpretation of the United Nations Charter:
"Recognized exercises of sovereignty are acts legally attributed to the
will of the designated territory's permanent population as a whole.
Statehood is conceptualized as consummating the self-determination
of a "people."147 In other words, instead of resulting from a specific
government department, sovereignty manifests itself by actions which
reflect the shared decisions of the populace. 148  These actions,
however, must reflect the will of the national populace, not those of
other nations' governments or citizens. A core feature of a sovereign
state is that it "must exhibit some de facto external independence ...
independence of one state from its peers."4 If sovereignty therefore
entails a state's ability to act and rule, by fulfilling the self-
determination of a nation, independent of other states, then the U.S.
appears to be losing sovereignty to the E.U. and other international
organizations - at least regarding fragranced personal care products.
The U.S. is allowing outside actors to fill the gaps in its own
regulatory regime, which is affecting consumers and industry.
The E.U. has been creative in deploying their sovereignty to
create and influence regulatory organizations. What they appear to
be employing is "variable geometry" sovereignty,"'o where sovereignty
is "pooled where appropriate, and employed uninationally where
advantageous to the nation-state.""' Some call this the "new"
sovereignty, where states have the capacity and willingness, to
participate in international institutions.'
147. Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 1017, 1023 (2004). Roth based this definition on the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082/Annex (Oct. 24,1970).
148. Roth, supra note 146.
149. Diane M. Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax
and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 155,159-160 (2008).
150. Marsden, supra note 137, at 373-74.
151. Id. at 420.
152. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
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Under either of the two theories regarding the future of
sovereignty, examined below, the current status quo for the U.S. is
unfavorable. To maintain control over the regulation of fragranced
personal care products and to support both domestic consumer and
business interests, the U.S. must reevaluate its current conception of
sovereignty. A reevaluation would encourage more U.S. oversight of
the fragrance industry, so as not only to prevent other nations and
organizations from regulating U.S. citizens, but also to ensure that
U.S. industry and consumers are supported.
Under the first approach, sovereignty is perceived as heading
towards extinction. 153 Globalization, including the growth of
multinational organizations and corporations, is said to be weakening
the authority of the state.154 States as sovereigns are declining because
their power is "leak[ing] away, upwards, sideways, and downwards"'
and because states are increasingly forced to adhere to international
laws and principles, as opposed to national ones.5
Pursuant to this first conceptualization, due to comparative
regulatory inactivity, the U.S. is rapidly "leaking away" a significant
proportion of its sovereignty in this arena. As seen, industry-
sponsored organizations, both domestic and international, are now
the most significant regulators of fragranced personal care products.
Unlike the E.U., however, which, under this first approach, only
shares sovereignty with international organizations, the U.S. is losing
control both to international organizations and other multinational
bodies. While analysts are in agreement that because of the
increasingly global economy and culture, complete independence,
idealized by this approach, is now impractical, it is helpful to note that
the E.U. only partially "leaked" away its authority. For instance,
such authority was leaked in part to IFRA. Because of the active role
played by the SCCNFP, however, the E.U. nevertheless maintains
partial independence whereas the U.S., with virtually no
governmental oversight, either through the CIR or the VCRP,
appears to be on the other end of the spectrum of sovereign
independence.
The second conceptualization of sovereignty maintains that
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"sovereignty remains intact even when there is a transfer of
competence,"' 7 and that such "transfers of competence" are in
themselves exercises of sovereignty: "However paradoxical it sounds,
the measure of a state's capacity to act as an independent unit within
the international system - the condition that 'sovereignty' purports
both to grant and describe - depends on the breadth and depth of its
links to other states.""' This is different from the first conception of
sovereignty not only because sovereignty is seen as intact, but also
because it addresses delegation. Under the first approach, delegating
sovereignty is seen as a loss; under the second conception, delegating
is perceived as an expansion of sovereign capacity.
While U.S. behavior in light of this second approach may initially
engender a positive assessment, when considering the points noted in
Section I, namely that the U.S. has not established any international
organizations to regulate cosmetics or collaborated with other
nations, U.S. sovereignty can still be seen as declining. There is no
evident "linkage" or "transfer of competence" in cosmetic regulation.
But a distinction must also be made between "transferring
competence" and "leaking" it away. In this context, transferring
suggests a deliberate intent to apportion control, whereas leakage
suggests an inadvertent loss of authority. Under this interpretation,
the E.U. is transferring and the U.S. is leaking. Additionally, in order
to transfer something, you must first possess the matter to be
transferred. As the U.S. never provided material regulatory
oversight, it is difficult to argue that the U.S. transferred its
competence to international organizations, or the E.U.
The U.S. federal government's failure to participate and take a
leadership role in the creation of international regulatory bodies is
incongruous with these contemporary notions of sovereignty. The
U.S. government may now take advantage of the present regulatory
flexibility to become an international leader. In light of the new
sovereignty, where transnational ties are increasingly essential, the
establishment of an international regulatory body for example,
comprised only of state heads, would greatly contribute to the
maintenance and expansion of U.S. sovereignty. The present gaps in
U.S. regulation are allowing others to determine the outcomes of the
fragrance industry. Whereas the current application of U.S.
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sovereignty suggests that these gaps are deliberate, this approach is
impractical because, deliberate or not, the gaps are being filled by
outside actors. Who or what will continue to fill the regulatory
vacuum is a resolution the U.S. must make. The sustainable self-
determination of U.S. consumers and the fragranced-cosmetic
business depends on the answer to this question.
B. Implementing Canadian Legislation
The United States is becoming a "dumping ground" for consumer
goods that are unwanted and illegal in much of the world.
- Michael Wilson 1S9
While sovereignty determinations are necessarily complex,
lengthy, and impractical, this paper also recommends a more short-
term legislative route to addressing the issues discussed in the
preceding sections. This proposal aims to safeguard fragrance
formulation and to protect consumers without overhauling the
current U.S. intellectual property regime or engaging in controversial
policy discussions. This alternative could be accomplished by
amending the FDCA to include a provision found in the Canadian
code, a code which possesses characteristics of both the U.S. and E.U.
regimes.260 While such a solution would not address Mackie's reverse-
engineering dilemma, mentioned in Section I, it would address what
Mackie's proposal omitted - a mechanism to protect consumer safety.
In Canada, fragrances, like all cosmetics and personal care
products, are regulated by the federal government pursuant to the
Cosmetic Regulations promulgated under the Food and Drugs Act.16'
While there are similarities between the Canadian provisions and the
E.U. Directive, a distinguishing facet is Section 30(2)(d).162  A
distinctive component, however, is Section 30(2)(d). Pursuant to this
provision, manufacturers must provide the Minister of Health with a
"list of the cosmetic's ingredients and, for each ingredient, either its
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exact concentration or the concentration range."163 Manufacturers
must file this list with Health Canada "within 10 days, at the latest,
from the day on which the product is placed on the market."1' These
submitted ingredients are then compared to the national Cosmetic
Ingredients Hotlist to ensure that the product does not contain any
known harmful chemicals and is safe for use.16 ' This list is based on
the E.U. Cosmetics Directive and contains almost five hundred
banned ingredients.
Although the ingredient identification and concentration data
given to the Ministry is not available to the public for proprietary
reasons, it provides Health Canada with the opportunity to review
new products and compare them to the Hotlist.16' The ingredients are
included on a national database that can be used to contact suppliers
if and when new information regarding risk becomes known. *
Unlike in the U.S., the scientific advisory committees that examine
the ingredient list are made up of government officials. 169
Incorporating Section 30(2)(d) into the FDCA regime would
improve consumer protection and reassure manufacturers concerned
about losing trade secret privileges. Consumers would gain additional
protection because the manufacturer would be obligated to disclose
every ingredient to government staff, even the items comprising the
fragrance formula. Because the public and competing manufacturers
would not be privy to this information, fragrance designers would not
be at risk of having their creations duplicitously manufactured.
In order to maximize the benefits of such a change, two parallel,
and likely more difficult, adjustments are desirable. First, the list of
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banned substances by the U.S. should be updated. As stated, the
E.U. list includes more than 1,000 banned substances,' Canada has
listed 500,1' and the U.S., a mere fifteen. 72 If manufacturers were to
submit their ingredient lists pursuant to the implemented Section
30(2)(d), these must be compared to an updated list of dangerous
substances. Adjusting the banned substance list to keep it up to date,
may also help manufacturers gain consumer trust and sales.
As in Canada, the U.S. would be well-served if it employed
government scientists to review the banned substance list and
manufacturer submissions, as compared to the status quo, where
industry representatives review the ingredient lists. If government
officials are responsible for the review, transparency and
accountability will be enhanced, and conflicts of interest minimized.
These recommendations are not a panacea. First, consumers
would still have to decide whether they should purchase a product
without full disclosure of ingredients. Second, the problem of reverse
engineering by competitors would not be alleviated. On balance,
however, there would be benefits to both consumers and to business,
particularly when paired with additional changes, such as a re-
evaluation of the banned substances list and the establishment of a
non-industry review board.
V. Conclusion
The current gaps in the U.S. regulatory regime are causing
consumers to question the safety of American cosmetics and are
therefore generating unfavorable business results. Consumers are
concerned because of the lack of a pre-market review process, the
trade secret labeling loophole, a minimal list of prohibited
ingredients, and the comparatively stringent E.U. regulations. The
E.U. regulations are distinguishable in key respects. Not only is the
banned ingredient list many times larger than the U.S. list, but it is
also has a broader scope. While both jurisdictions protect the trade
secret in fragrance formulae from full disclosure on product labels,
the E.U. regulations have allergen and other exceptions. In these
respects, the E.U. system offers greater consumer protection.
170. Council Directive, supra note 50, at annex II.
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[Vol. 34:1250
Fragrant or Foul?
Moreover, consumers may be supportive of the E.U. system, to
the detriment of the U.S. cosmetic manufacturing, as a result of
misinformation. Although synthetics, for example, are widely held by
the fragrance industry to be modern, safe, and essential, there is a
misconception that they are more dangerous than natural ingredients
and that they are found more in U.S. products than in E.U. products.
Additional regulatory standards would therefore be helpful, not only
to address legitimate consumer concerns, but also to support industry,
which may be harmed by inaccurate information about its products.
The safety of cosmetic ingredients is increasingly the province of
national and international industry-sponsored organizations. Because
these associations issue non-binding guidelines about the quality of
ingredients, that are often only available through subscription by
members, there are legitimate questions about the accountability and
transparency of the industry. Again, this may disadvantage U.S.
business interests. While the principal ingredient review in the U.S. is
done through the CIR, which is also industry-sponsored, the E.U.'s
SCCNFP is comprised of government-approved staff from each
member state. As a government-endorsed body, the E.U. regime is
seen as more credible in the oversight of cosmetics.
The author maintains that such issues stem from an outdated
conception of sovereignty, as applied to the fragranced-personal care
product market. Even though the definition and form of
contemporary sovereignty is contested, it seems apparent that
because foreign and industry-sponsored associations are providing
more comprehensive oversight concerning the ingredients and
labeling of cosmetic ingredients than the U.S., that the U.S. is failing
in its duty to oversee the interests of its populace. The E.U. is also
influencing consumer perceptions and leading U.S. citizens to trust
the safety of foreign cosmetic products to the detriment of U.S.
goods. This leaking, or non-deliberate transference of sovereignty,
can be mitigated if the U.S. takes advantage of the comparatively
light cosmetic regulatory system to fill in the gaps that other, non-
sovereign actors presently address. Supporting a governmental
ingredient review board for instance, would allow the elected
government to oversee the formulation of products that consumers
are increasingly unwilling to trust.
While regulation and policy arising from a re-conceived notion of
sovereignty are difficult and time-consuming to apply, other, more
immediate solutions to fragrance issues are needed. One such
solution involves the emulation Section 30(2)(d) of the Canadian
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Cosmetics Regulations. This has the potential to alleviate key health
and business concerns which contribute to the leaking of U.S.
sovereignty. The enactment of such a provision, requiring
manufacturers to submit to the government a complete list of
ingredients, would uphold the trade secret protection for
manufacturers. This provision would also, because of the attendant
requirement that the complete ingredient list be reviewed by the
FDA, placate consumer anxiety concerning the safety of "hidden"
ingredients.
Because sovereignty fundamentally reflects a state's duty to its
populace, through inadequate fragrance regulations, the U.S. is
reneging in its duties both to industry and consumers. Implementing
the changes discussed in this note has the potential to address these
dilemmas. Not only is the regulatory climate ripe for such
adjustments, but the current "fragrance forecast," a term coined by
manufacturers to gauge the economic climate by the level of perfume
purchases, is up by ten percent."
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